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Military Justice in the United States
Marine Corps After 9/11:
Does the War on Terror Change How
Justice is Defined or Whether Justice
Can Ever Be Achieved?
Jon Shelburne
This trial is a kind of tactics. It is a natural action and
not a moral action. Suppose one throws a ball and it falls.
Then we can see the ball stop (bouncing). But actually it
rolls a little while by inertia. In the same way, the war is
going on yet. It is not an ordinary court. It is a
continuation of the war ....

You can kill people by any

means. It is more advantageous to kill by means of such a
trial than with a gun. '
INTRODUCTION

Before retiring from command of United States Central

1. Valentine B. Deale, Letter to the Editor, The Tokyo Tribunal:
Principlesand Practicesof Procedure Criticized, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 1948,
at E8. (In his letter to the editor, Mr. Deale quotes a former Japanese war
leader. Mr. Deale served as the Acting Director of the American Defense
Counsel at the military tribunals conducted in Japan immediately after
WWII. His letter to the Editor was openly critical of the way defense services
were provided to senior Japanese admirals and generals facing the penalty of
death at the hands of the tribunals. While the trials at Nuremberg receive
significant attention from history books and legal scholars, the trials held in
Japan are virtually forgotten or ignored.).
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Command, General John Abizaid coined the term "Long War" 2 to
describe the conflict United States military forces have been
engaged in since 9/11. The attempt by General Abizaid to shift
the focus from the War on Terror to a more accurate description of
a conflict that has both military and political ramifications beyond
the borders of Afghanistan and Iraq had a noble purpose but also
the unintended consequence of conveying a message to the Middle
East that
the United States and coalition forces might never
3
leave.
More recently, unrest in Tunisia sparked waves of protest
throughout the Middle East and Africa. While the protests and
riots have caused some governments to tumble and others to begin
making reforms, the Libyans find themselves in the midst of a
violent struggle for control in a country that has been dominated
by Muammar Gaddafi for more than forty years. 4 The decision by
President Obama to allow the United States to join a coalition of
countries engaged in armed responses to the violence in Libya has
been praised by some and criticized by many, 5 but the simple
reality for the United States military is that the conflict in Libya
is just one more engagement in a war that is being fought globally.
At the time of this writing, it is too early to tell whether the
United States involvement in coalition operations in Libya will be
one week, one month, one year, or even longer. Regardless of the
timing or the extent of this or any other military engagement, one
thing that is certain is: wherever the United States military goes,
military lawyers go also. 6 And while the primary focus of military
2. See Michael R. Gordon, U.S. Shortens Life of 'Long War' as a
Reference, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 2007, at A14 (In a short article in the NY
Times, Michael Gordon highlights the many different terms used by military
commanders and officials within the Bush administration to define the
conflict being waged by American forces. The article captures the essence of
the problem of defining a conflict that is not limited to the borders of Iraq and
has no discernible beginning or end.).
3. Id.
4. See Dirk Vandewalle, After Gaddafi, NEWSWEEK (Feb. 21, 2011),
http://www.newsweek.com/2011/O2/27/after-gaddafi.html.
5. See Jeff Zeleny, Airstrikes in Libya; Questions Back Home, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 20, 2011)

http://www.nytimes.com2011/03/21/world/africa/

2 lprexy.html.
6. See generally Marine Corps Judge Advocate, U.S. MARINE CORPS
(2011),
http://officer.marines.com/marine/winning-battles/leadershippositionsflaw/judge-advocate.
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lawyers in any mission is to ensure the conduct of operations is
legal and justifiable under the international law of armed conflict,
military justice matters inevitably follow wherever
troops are
7
engaged in the battle or other supporting operations.
This Article focuses on the delivery of military justice services
in a post 9/11 military and how the delivery of the services of the
defense bar is inevitably impacted by the changing nature of the
battlefield.
Perhaps more importantly, this Article raises
questions about the effectiveness of the delivery the United States
Marine Corps in providing such defense services. To examine this
issue, the Article will first focus on several scenarios taken from
various military legal offices followed by a brief history of how the
armed services attempted to provide defense counsel and services
to military personnel prior to 9/11. Next, the Article will focus on
the law, military orders and other ethical obligations that
mandate delivery of such services. The article will then look at
how the Marine defense bar is organized post 9/11 and how
military justice is defined by the current system in place. Finally,
this Article will conclude by looking at proposed changes to the
current way military justice is administered and explore whether
those proposed changes go far enough to provide justice to military
service members who are charged with crimes under the Uniform
Code of Military Justice in a time of undeclared war.
SETTING THE STAGE

Military justice matters are infused into all aspects of a
military operation no matter where that operation is being
conducted and regardless of the circumstances. 8 The case the
United States Army is prosecuting against Private First Class
Bradley Manning 9 is a highly visible example of how military
justice matters are always a factor in any military operation.
7. Id.
8. See generally Victor M. Hansen, Changes in Modern Military Codes
and the Role of the Military Commander: What Should the United States
Learn from this Revolution?, 16 TUL.J. COMP. & INT'L L. 419 (2008).
9. PFC Manning is an Army specialist who is facing charges ranging
from simple orders violations to espionage in connection with allegations that
he provided a significant number of classified documents and other classified
information to an organization known as 'Vikileaks." See Charlie Savage,
Soldier Faces 22 New WikiLeaks Charges, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 2011, available
at www.nytimes.com/2011/03/03/us/03manning.html.
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Those unfamiliar with the inner workings of military intelligence
question how someone who ranks as low as a Private First Class
could have access to so much classified information.' 0 Manning
claims that he is simply a whistleblower who should be protected
from being charged for doing what he is lawfully required to do by
the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). 11 His alleged
violations of the UCMJ occurred while participating in operations
in Iraq. However, Private First Class Manning is not the only
soldier accused of espionage since the War on Terror began. Army
Specialist Ryan Anderson was convicted by a court-martial in
2004 after a joint Department of Justice and Federal Bureau of
Investigation sting operation uncovered evidence that Anderson,
while serving at Fort Lewis in Washington state, sought to share
secrets about tanks and other weaponry to individuals he believed
to be Al Qaeda operatives. 12 For his misconduct, Anderson
received a sentence of life with the possibility of parole, reduction
to private, forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and a dishonorable
discharge. 13 In another recent case, Navy Intelligence Specialist
10. Marc Ambinder, an online political blogger who writes for the
National Journal, states, "[s]keptics of the government's case against
Manning wonder how one young soldier, operating with a couple of computers
in the middle of desert, could access and download so much classified
information and do so undetected for so long . . . . But in the modern
military, which relies on information as much as bullets and bunkers, it's
easier than one might think to gain access to classified material and to
disseminate it, according to interviews with numerous officials." See Marc
Ambinder, WikiLeak: How Could One Person Leak So Much Classified
Material?, NAT'L J., available at http://news.yahoo.com/s/yblog__exclusive/
20101130/plyblogexclusive/wikileaks-how-could-one-person-leak-so-muchclassified-material.
11. PFC Manning is accused of several violations of the UCMJ including,
but not limited to Article 92 orders violations. Among these charges are
allegations he violated the provisions of 18 United States Code § 793
prohibiting disclosure of classified information. However, PFC Manning may
argue that Department of Defense Directive 2311.01E dated May 9, 2006, the
same Directive used to charge LtCol Chessani and the officers in his chain of
command, requiring soldiers to report known violations of the law of armed
conflict. See infra, note 92.
12. See Famous Espionage Cases (2000-2004) in the USA, STRATEGIC
ANALYSIS (Nov. 1, 2006, 02:04 AM), http://strategicanalysis.wordpress.com
2006/11/01/famous-espionage-cases-2000-2004-in-the-usa (citing the case of
Army Specialist Ryan Anderson). See also United States v. Anderson, 68 M.J.
378, 308-81 (C.A.A.F. 2010).
13. Famous Espionage Cases (2000-2004) in the USA, STRATEGIC
ANALYsIs (Nov. 1, 2006, 02:04 AM), http://strategicanalysis.wordpress.com/
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Second Class B. Minkyu Martin faces charges of espionage and
mishandling classified material for attempting to sell highly
classified material to officers from the Federal Bureau of
14
Investigation who were again posing as enemy operatives.
Martin's alleged violations of the UCMJ are alleged to have
occurred while he served as an intelligence analyst at Fort Bragg,
North Carolina. 15
While Private First Class Manning's case receives significant
national attention, the other cases noted above, as well as many
more cases not specifically mentioned, 16 are not widely publicized
outside of close military circles. Yet all of these cases highlight
how military justice matters arise at all ranks and at all stations
both inside and outside of combat zones. What is troubling in
these cases is the varying level of defense services available to
these Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, and Marines. How is justice
defined in these circumstances? Is the definition the same as in
Has the War on Terror
any other military courts-martial?
changed the definition for all of the aforementioned defendants?
Does the outrageous publicity in Private First Class Manning's
case change the paradigm for his case only, or does the media
exposure of his case or that of the Abu Ghraib defendants 17 add
another layer to the definition of justice? Does justice get
sacrificed on the altar of public opinion in such circumstances, or
are military juries and military defense lawyers immune from the
2006/11/01famous-espionage-cases-2000-2004-in-the-usa.
14. Lauren King, Sailor Charged with Attempted Espionage is Held In
Norfolk, THE VIRGINIAN PILOT (Mar. 4, 2011), http://hamptonroads.com.nyud.
net/2011/03/ncbased-sailor-charged-attempted-espionage. At the time of this
writing, the case of United States v. Martin is pending referral to a general
courts-martial so no cite is available.

15.

Id.

16. From 2009 to 2010, the author of this article defended a Reserve
Marine Colonel at Camp Pendleton on charges of espionage and mishandling
of classified material. The Colonel and four other Marines ranging in rank
from Major to Staff Sergeant faced similar charges stemming from activities
that were alleged to have involved foreign agents and sharing classified
information outside official Department of Defense channels.
17. Staff Sergeant Ivan L. Frederick II, Specialist Charles A. Graner,
Sergeant Javal Davis, Specialist Megan Ambuhl, Specialist Sabrina Harman
and Private Jeremy Sivits were charged and tried in Iraq while Private
Lynndie England was charged and later tried at Ft. Bragg. See Seymour M.
Hersh, Torture at Abu Ghraib, THE NEW YORKER, May 10, 2004,
http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2004/05/10/040510fafact.
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pressure which inevitably flows down from above when too many
questions get asked by those outside the military community?
THE MARINE CORPS RESPONSE

Marines pride themselves on being able to make decisions
quickly, efficiently and effectively despite the fog of war or other
friction that might exist in a given situation. We all train the
same way, learn the same steps in the Marine Corp Planning
Process, 18 and embrace the same leadership principals so that
when we are confronted with difficult situations we can observe,
orient, decide, and act faster than our enemy. 19 We pride
ourselves on being able to fight the current war, while still
maintaining a forward-thinking, forward-leaning posture to be
ready for the next war or contingency that will inevitably arise.
We always do well in anticipating what the enemy will do on the
battlefield or in adjusting swiftly when the enemy does the
unexpected or acts in an unconventional manner. However,
Marines are not always so quick, efficient or effective when it
comes to recognizing flaws in the way we handle administrative
issues or processes. Change is viewed as the enemy and staunchly
resisted - often times for no better reason or justification than
"that's the way we've ALWAYS done it, Marine!" As quick as we
are to recognize the need for flexibility on the battlefield, at the
same time we fail to recognize or embrace the need for the same
flexibility within our administrative procedures. Any change to
orders covering existing procedures is generally met with
significant resistance. Such is the case with a current proposal to
revise and update the orders covering the way the Marine Corps
provides defense services to Marines accused of violating the
UCMJ. 20

The proposed changes come as a direct response to

18.

See generally Marine Corps Planning Process, MARINE CORPS
5-1, available at http://smallwarsjournal.com/
document/mcwp5-l.pdf.
19. The OODA Loop - observe, orient, decide and act - is a concept
coined by retired Air Force General John Boyd. The Marine Corps includes
this decision making cycle in one of its most widely published and distributed
manuals. See generally Warfighting, U.S. MARINE CORPS DOCTRINAL
PUBLICATION
1, available at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/j el/servicepubs/mcdpl.pdf.
20. Working Group Draft Proposals for the Manual of the Judge
Advocate General,
0130, 0131, [hereinafter JAGMA] (on file with
WARFIGHTING PUBLICATION
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recommendations provided to the Secretary of Defense in
December of 2010 by an independent panel studying the
possibility of combining
the Judge Advocate General Corps of each
21
Services.
the
of
To understand the current proposals for change within the
Marine Corps specifically one must first understand the broader
mandate of the Section 506 panel.2 2 To answer the larger question
of whether the services should combine into one large legal the
panel's report made several findings regarding the changing
nature of the way in which legal services are provided by the Navy
and Marine Corps. 2 3 Among other things, the panel concluded
that operational requirements and the corresponding demand for
more judge advocates to answer law of armed conflict issues or
other questions related to operations in the field would continue to
increase due to the ongoing war effort. 24 In examining the
increased role for judge advocates in a combat environment, the
panel examined the involvement of lawyers across operations in
both Iraq and Afghanistan. 25 The provision of defense services
was only one small part of this equation included within the
broader scope of providing military justice support in the field.2 6
Additional findings are included that note a continuing need for
defense attorneys in support of the military commissions

author); Working Groups Draft Proposal for the Marine Corps Manual for
Legal Administration, Ch. 2, [hereinafter LEGADMINMAN] (on file with
author).
21. An independent panel comprised of Navy and Marine senior officers,
civilians, and lawyers complied with an order from the Secretary of Defense
to respond to a mandate contained in section 506 of the National Defense
Authorization Act of 2010.
The mandate essentially required the
Department of Defense to look at how legal services are provided to members
of each of the armed services. See generally National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-84, 123 Stat. 2190, (2009).
22. Id.
23. The independent panel produced a large report detailing their
findings and providing extensive support for the position that Navy and
Marine legal services should remain separate from the Air Force JAG and
Army JAG services. See NAVY 506 PANEL, INDEP. REVIEW PANEL OF JUDGE
ADVOCATE REQUIREMENTS OF THE DEP'T OF THE NAVY, (2010) [hereinafter 506
Draft Report], available at http://www.caaflog.com/ 2010/12/22/navy-506panel-draft-report/.
24. Id. at 50.
25. Id. at 63-70.
26. Id. at 67.
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conducted at Guantanamo. 27 The findings here are supported by
little more than a review of the numbers required to continue
prosecuting the cases. Perhaps more telling is the conclusion that
"the most experienced and accomplished litigators" will be
required to prosecute the thirty-four commissions remaining. The
finding is further supported by the need to continue to fund the
Navy's military justice specialty track without reference to
Marines and there is no specific reference to defense services by
either service. 28 Likewise, the justification for the findings and
recommendations is also devoid of any call for justice or fairness
in the process.
The provision of military justice services to Sailors and
Marines in the context of prosecution and defense of courts29
martial is only a small part of the overall 506 draft response.
The Marine Corps drafted another more specific response to the
Section 506 review. 30 Included within this response is a renewed
pledge to put more emphasis on the delivery of quality military
31
justice services, for both the prosecution and defense.
Incorporated within this pledge is a call to ensure the defense bar
within the Marine Corps is fully equipped to provide independent
and fair representation to all Marines charged with violations of
the UCMJ. 32 However, at the same time the pledge is being

offered, the report takes a self-congratulatory tone as the authors
note how developed the defense bar is under the current
structure. 33 The problem with this assessment and pledge is that
the assessment fails to acknowledge that the Marine Corps is the
only service in which the defense bar is not fully independent and
27. Id. at 78.
28. Id. at 82.
29.
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, Pub. L.
No. 111-84,
30. MARINE CORPS LEGAL SERVICES, STRATEGIC ACTION PLAN 2010-2015,
http://www.marines.mil/unit/judgeadvocate/Documents/Home%20Page/Legal
_SAP/SAPAndAnnexes/LegalServiceSAP.pdf.
31. Id. at 15.
32. Id. at 15-16.
33. Id. at 16. "The defense organization is intended to strike a balance
between ensuring the unfettered ability of defense counsel to zealously
represent their clients and maintaining flexibility in judge advocate
assignments to ensure continued growth and maturation of well-rounded
MAGTF officer judge advocates. It has worked well for 25 years." (emphasis
added).
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the pledge to put more emphasis on military justice starts the
process with a baseline belief that the defense bar is already fully
functional. Hence the need to reiterate the question posed at the
outset of this Article. How is justice defined after 9/11 and can it
be achieved in a Marine Corps that continues to insist not only is
nothing broken but also that the defense bar is stronger than
34
ever?
REAL CASES HIGHLIGHT CONFLICTS OF INTEREST AND FLAWED JUSTICE

Consider the following scenarios 35 as a way to frame the issue
of developing a system that allows for judge advocates to deliver
competent, conflict free advice in a system that is inherently
biased toward the government and the prosecution:
Situationi: A Marine judge advocate serving as a defense
counsel (DC) at a large West Coast base aggressively represents
her client in a case while the investigation into the charges under
the UCMJ is still ongoing. Interaction between the DC, the
Commanding Officer (CO) and several other senior officers at the
Battalion become heated. The DC is junior to everyone in the
room but does not back down from allegations that she is
overstepping her authority. Her argument with the CO borders
on disrespect but is merely a response to the provocation by the
senior officers and is arguably nothing more than an aggressive
effort to assist and represent her client.
The DC apologizes to the CO and other officers involved in the
argument as soon as the meeting is concluded. After the incident
in the CO's office, the DC is counseled by her Senior Defense
Counsel (SDC), the Regional Defense Counsel (RDC) and the
Officer in Charge (OIC) for the Legal Service Support Section
(LSSS). The SDC and RDC are also the Reviewing Senior (RS)
34. Id. at 16.
35. The first two situations chronicled in this section are taken almost
verbatim from a memo written by then LtCol John J. Canham, who was
serving at the time as a Regional Defense Counsel on the West Coast. The
memo was drafted August 1998 and forwarded to the Chief Defense Counsel
of the Marine Corps. See Letter from Lieutenant Colonel John Canham to
Chief Defense Counsel of the Marine Corps (Aug. 27, 1998) (on file with
author) [hereinafter Canham Letter].
Situations 3 and 4 are from cases tried and appealed through the
Navy-Marine Corps courts. These cases also highlight conflicts of interest
endemic to the Marine Corps.
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and Reviewing Officer (RO) for the DC but the OIC still has
administrative control over all JA assignments at the LSSS to
include the DC involved in this matter and all other prosecution
and defense counsel at the command. The OIC answers to the
senior Staff Judge Advocate (SJA) at the MEF and is the RO for
all the Trial Counsel (TC) and JAs who work in Legal Assistance.
Over the objection of the RDC and SDC and despite the CO's
acceptance of the original apology, the OIC makes the
determination that the DC will be relieved and reassigned to
Legal Assistance if she doesn't apologize a second time and in a
more formal way to the CO and the other officers who were
present during the argument.
Situation 2: An OIC makes the decision to transfer his most
successful TC to the defense section at the same large West Coast
base. Less than two weeks into the assignment, and after six
cases have already been assigned to the DC, the OIC is pressured
by the senior SJAs at the area commands to bring the counsel
back to the government side and reassign him as a TC again. No
justification for the removal and reassignment of the junior
counsel is offered to the SDC or RDC but later the OIC admits the
SJAs from the area commands expressed concerns that putting
the best litigator in the defense section would adversely affect the
prosecution of all cases brought by the government at this large
base.
Situation 3:36 A new DC in Hawaii is appointed as the SDC
for the legal office that provides defense services to any Marines
stationed on the island accused of violating the UCMJ. This SDC
is a senior Captain but is new to the legal field having recently
graduated from law school and Naval Justice School (NJS) in
Newport, Rhode Island. Soon after taking over as SDC, he is
presented with a case involving a recently mobilized senior
Reserve Lieutenant Colonel who is charged with several violations
of the UCMJ and is headed to an article 32 hearing. The new
SDC is not familiar with Reserve Marine issues and because the
Lieutenant Colonel is eligible for promotion and retirement, the
SDC strongly believes he needs other outside help for the client.
36. The facts set forth in situation 3 are taken from United States v.
Wiechmann, 67 M.J. 456 (2009). The author was the lead military counsel in
this case.
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Based on his initial evaluation of the case, the SDC
immediately calls his RDC, a Lieutenant Colonel who is stationed
in Okinawa and supervises all defense counsel assigned to the
Western Pacific Region. After much discussion, the RDC agrees
the SDC needs outside help on the case but he is unavailable to
provide the help himself due to conflicts created by a large number
of high visibility cases which have recently been charged on the
West Coast. The RDC briefs the Chief Defense Counsel (CDC) of
the Marine Corps and they agree that detailing the Reserve RDC,
who is also a Lieutenant Colonel, is the best solution to the case.
They agree that existing rules for detailing counsel are somewhat
limited when it comes to using a reserve JA on active duty cases
but that it can be done. The CDC makes the determination she
will detail the Reserve JA who lives in Rhode Island to assist the
young SDC and ensure the accused is properly represented by
competent counsel.
The SDC promptly informs the SJA, the OIC and the TC of
the new detailed DC being assigned to the case and attorney client
relationship which is formed based on that assignment. The SJA
is upset by the arrangement because he does not believe the CDC
has detailing authority under the existing regulations or that a
reservist can be detailed to a case unless the reservist is serving
on active duty. As such, he instructs the TC and OIC to refuse to
recognize the reserve DC as counsel in the case.
By the time the case gets to trial, the SDC and the reserve
detailed DC file several motions on behalf of the accused
Lieutenant Colonel. One motion specifically raises the issue of
Unlawful Command Influence (UCI) by the SJA, the OIC and one
of the military judges in the circuit. Among other things, the UCI
motion alleges that the OIC is threatening to remove the SDC and
reassign him to legal assistance due to animosity created by the
SDC's aggressive handling of this and other cases. Before the
conclusion of the trial in the case, the SDC is reassigned to legal
assistance at the law center and his reporting chain now includes
the same OIC against whom the UCI motion was filed as the RS
on his fitness report.
Situation 4:37 A DC at a large East Coast base is assigned as
37.

The facts in this situation are taken from the case of United States v.

Lee, 66 M.J. 387 (2008).
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detailed counsel for the defense of a Marine accused of several
serious violations of the UCMJ and who is facing a General CourtMartial. During the Marine's representation, the detailed DC
informs him that he will be wrapping up his defense cases and
that he will be working as a TC in the same office that is currently
prosecuting the charges against the Marine. The DC says his new
duties will entail prosecuting minor offenses but he does not say
anything about for whom or with whom he will be working or who
his RS will be when he moves to the prosecution. The accused
Marine agreed to the arrangement because his DC told him there
will not be any conflict of interest. However, the Marine is
convicted at trial and receives a severe punishment. After trial,
the Marine learns that his detailed DC had actually been working
as a TC on another serious case while simultaneously
representing him. He also discovers that in the other case his
detailed DC was working for the same TC who prosecuted his case
and that they both worked for the same senior trial counsel.
Unfortunately, the four situations described above are not
unique or isolated incidents. 38 These situations are merely
provided as anecdotal evidence representative of a much larger
and widespread problem with the provision of defense services to
Marines accused of violating the UCMJ. These situations, taken
together, also highlight an even bigger problem than those simply
stated by the facts of each case - they reflect the institutional
blindness the Marine Corps has toward the need for an
independent defense bar. The Marine Corps is the only service
defense bar 39 and consistently
that does not have an independent
40
rejects calls for such a change.
These four situations were chosen specifically because they
reflect long-standing problems in the way the Marine Corps
requires defense services be provided and the Marine Corps's
resistance to change in this regard. The first two situations were
38. See Canham Letter, supra note 35.
39. T.G. Hess, Staff Judge Advocate to Comman Marine Corps,
Reorganization of Defense Services in the Marine Corps (position paper) (May
10, 1998) (on file with author) [hereinafter Reorganization of Defense
Services]. (In the position paper, the SJA provided the Commandant with a
short history of how the other services established independent defense bars
in 1974, 1980 and 1995 leaving the Marines as the only service that had not
done so.).
40. Id.
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cited in a memorandum from the RDC for the West Coast penned
to the CDC of the Marine Corps in 1998.41 This standard Naval
letter contained a simple question in the subject line, "DO
PROBLEMS EXIST IN TODAYS MARINE CORPS WHICH
JUSTIFIES [sic] THE REORGANIZATION OF THE DEFENSE
STRUCTURE? '42 To answer that question in the affirmative, the
RDC identifies ten different, real-world situations raised by the
conduct of, or conflicts between and among, government counsel
and prosecutors in the mid-90s. 43 The harsh reality of the facts
and situations highlighted in this memorandum is that defense
attorneys in the Marine Corps practice under a system which is
inherently flawed and subject to bias and many of the policies
which allow for such flawed practice were implemented as far
back as the early 1980s.
The cases which provide the factual basis for Situations 3 and
4 are instructive because they occurred almost ten years after the
memorandum from the RDC on the West Coast." Both of these
cases raise issues of constitutional proportions and one of the
45
cases is still being argued in the appellate courts at this time.
The issues in these more recent cases are not so different from the
ones raised in the memo from the RDC nor are the issues raised in
1998 different than the issues raised by his predecessors ten years
earlier.

46

Of course this begs the question, how long must trial errors of
constitutional proportions be tolerated before the Marine Corps'
41. See Cahnham Letter, supranote 35.
42. Id. (emphasis in original).
43. Id.
44. See United States v. Wiechmann, 67 M.J. 456, 460 (2009) (tried in
2007); United States v. Lee, No. NMCCA 200600543, 2007 WL 1890683 (NM. Ct. Crim. App. Jun. 26, 2007) (tried in 2005).
45. Lee was remanded to the appropriate convening authority for further
inquiry by a trial court in 2008. 66 M.J. 387, 390 (2008). The case was
subsequently remanded a second time by the Navy-Marine Corps Court of
Criminal Appeals in 2009. See United States v. Lee, No. NMCCA 200600543,
2009 WL 3747173, at *4 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. Nov. 10, 2009).
46. Three years after the Marine Corps established a billet for the Chief
Defense Counsel and assigned all defense attorneys under the supervision of
three Regional Defense Counsel, Lieutenant Colonel J. Michael Roake who
served as one of the first three RDCs, published an article, "The Marine
Corps Defense Bar: A Paper Tiger," in the Marine Corps Gazette in
December, 1988. See Michael Roake, The Marine Corps Defense Bar: A Paper
Tiger, MARINE CORPS GAZETTE, December, 1988, at 27.
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legal community and the Marine Corps at large answer the
question raised by then Lieutenant Colonel Canham in 1998? The
systemic problems that give rise to inherent conflicts of interest
and allow for unlawful command influence on Marine defense
attorneys continue to exist more than twenty-five years after the
first attempts to satisfy the American Bar Association (ABA) and
Congress. 47 The systemic problems and corresponding failings or
shortcomings in the process provide ample justification for the
reorganization and establishment of an independent Marine
defense bar on par with her sister services.
A QUICK HISTORY
In December 1988, Lieutenant Colonel Roake chronicled the
development of what he characterized as the "semiseparate
Marine Corps defense bar, created in 1985 by Marine Corps Order
5800.11A.,,4 ' His article brings forth the sordid past that forced
the Marine Corps to create the then new position of CDC with a
corresponding hierarchy of RDCs who would supervise SDCs and
ostensibly all share a separate fitness report reporting chain from
their respective counterparts on the government side of the
LSSS. 49

These efforts to protect young JAs assigned to the

defense were borne out of perceptions that the playing field is
uneven, that defense counsel are subject to undue pressure from
commanders to play nice or run the risk of bad evaluations or
punitive transfers, and that the system as it existed prior to 1985
was fraught with actual conflicts or potential conflicts of
50

interest.

More than ten years before Marine Corps Order 5800.11A was
implemented, a 1973 memorandum from the Department of
Defense (DoD) called for the creation of separate defense bars for

47. See Colonel John G. Baker, Chief Defense Counsel of the Marine
Corps, Information Paper 5800/CDC, History of the Marine Corps Defense
Organization 2 (Dec. 17, 2010) [hereinafter, Baker, Information Paper
5800/CDC] (referencing a letter from the Judge Advocate Division to JAG
with the Marine Proposal in 1974). This proposal went unfunded and it was
not until 1985 that the Marine Corps established the office of the Chief
Defense Counsel. Id. at 7.
48. Roake, supra note 46.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 28-29.
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each of the services. 5 1 This DoD memorandum and mandate for
change came in response to significant pressure from Congress
after a number of missteps by military lawyers caused Congress to
question the ability of the services to fairly and effectively provide
for conflict-free defense services to military defendants.
The Air Force response to the 1973 memorandum was swift
and decisive. The Air Force established an independent defense
bar in 197452 while the Navy and Army continued to study the
options. The Army established its own independent defense bar,
the Trial Defense Service (TDS), in 1980. 53 By 1983, the Navy
incorporated certain standards that stopped short of giving the
defense bar complete independence but by 1995, the Navy
established autonomous defense commands as Naval Legal
Service Offices (NLSO) and split the TCs into separate and
independent Trial Service Offices (TSO).54 This left the Marine
Corps as the last service component operating under a model that
does not allow for DCs or their supervisors to operate
independently from the SJAs or OICs of the LSSS. 55
PUBLISHING

MCO 5800.11A

In 1984, the Marine Corps suffered a public relations setback
in an incident that many thought would surely be the catalyst for
significant change within the legal community. 56 Having largely
ignored the 1973 DoD memorandum and after offering many
times over to "study" the issue, the Marine legal offices in 1984
still largely shared buildings, office space, and personnel on both
sides of the courts-martial aisle.5 7 A DC at MCAS, El Toro wrote
several Senators and Congressmen complaining about the
treatment of DCs at Air Station, highlighting several specific
examples of abuse of authority by SJAs and the OIC at El Toro,
51. Baker, Information Paper 5800/CDC, supra note 47, at 2 (citing
Memorandum from the U.S. Sec'y of Def. (Jan. 22, 1973)).
52. Id.

53. Id. at 4-5. See also Reorganization of Defense Services in the Marine
Corps, supra note 39.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 2. See also Baker, Information Paper, supra note 47; Position
Paper of Chief Defense Counsel entitled "Defense Reorganization," (April 2,
2002) (on file with author).
56. See Baker, Information Paper, supra note 47, at 5.

57.

See id.
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58
and asking for an independent investigation into the matter.
His letter quite poignantly (and perhaps prophetically) highlights
a defect unique to the Marine Corps (then and to some degree
now) in that our assignments process allows the 59
SJA or OIC to
base.
given
a
at
assigned
are
counsel
where
control
Two separate investigations were convened in response to the
letters from the "rogue" DC. 60 One investigation focused almost
exclusively on the provision of defense services at the law center.
The other focused on the larger question of the assignments
process, the overall administration of justice, the logistical support
provided to counsel for both sides, and the ethics of running a law
center in such a fashion.
After receiving the reports of investigation from both
investigations, the Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC)
wrote a letter to the Secretary of the Navy on September 4, 1984
in which he essentially defended the overall method in which the
Marine Corps provides legal services but also found that the
system as it existed "exposes defense counsel to the potential for
improper pressures" and promised that "structural and procedural
changes will be implemented effective 1 February 1985 which will
adopt some of the beneficial features of the other services' defense
counsel systems,
tailored to Marine Corps missions and
61
readiness."
The Secretary of the Navy responded to CMC on September
20,1984.62 While agreeing with CMC's recommendations and
applauding the efforts to reform the system, the Secretary made a
very telling comment in providing further direction to CMC. 63 He
stated, "[i]n view of the clear need for separation of trial defense
counsel from the staff judge advocate chain of command, please
accelerate your proposed timetableFalse" 64 As a result of this
push from the Secretary, MCO 5800.11A was published on
November 15, 1985, establishing the office of the CDC and
creating three RDC positions to separate the reporting chains for

58.
59.
60.
61.

Id.
See id at 5-6.
Id. at 6.
Id.

62.

Baker, Information Paper, supranote 47, at 6.

63.

Id.

64.

Id. at 6-7.
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65
all JAs assigned to the defense bar.
WHERE ARE WE

Now?

The current CDC recently observed that "itihe effectiveness of
this supposedly independent defense organization has been
questioned from its inception."66 Since 1988, approximately every
three to five years a new call is sounded for reform of the defense
bar or for outright independence similar to the Army and Air
Force systems. 67 During that time, at least four position papers
have been staffed by a sitting CDC or the SJA to CMC in an
attempt to revise the orders which control the defense bar in the
Marine Corps. 68 Several CDCs have attempted unsuccessfully to
garner enough support for the defense bar to be fully independent
of the SJAs and OICs. 6 9 On each occasion, after an initial surge of
support from some commanders and senior officers within the
legal community, voices from other corners raise the concern that
independence will make DCs unaccountable to commanders, DCs
will become less a part of the Marine Corps, or ultimately, judge
advocates will be removed from the Marine Corps all together if
70
they cease to be complete MAGTF officers.
In 1998, the SJA to CMC explained the need for change when
he routed a proposal through HQMC asking for the creation of an
71
entirely separate command structure for the Marine defense bar.
The routing sheet on the cover of the proposal asks the question
that has consistently been asked since the efforts to force reform.
65.

Id. at 7.
Id.
67. LtCol Roake's Gazette Article in 1988 is the first published criticism
of the Marine Defense bar. See Roake, supra note 46. In 1995 Col Harvey
Hopson, then Chief Defense Counsel, staffed an information paper that never
made it past the SJA to the Commandant; in 1998, LtCol Canham's letter,
Canham supra note 35, was used to provide support for Brigadier General
Ted Hess's Headquarters Marine Corps Position Paper, Hess supra note 39
supra; Col Calvin Scovel's Position Paper calling for Defense Reorganization
was published in 2002, Scovel supra note 55 supra; Col Ralph Miller, Col
Carol Joyce and Col Rose Favors also made informal attempts to bring about
change within the defense bar in 2004, 2005 and 2009 respectively. Most
recently, Colonel John Baker published an information paper in December
2010. Baker, supra note 47.
68. Roake, supranote 46, at 27.
69. Id.at 28.
66.

70.

Baker, Information Paper 5800/CDC, supra note 47, at 8.

71.

Hess, supra note 39.
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The SJA asked quite simply, "... did we go far enough? ' 72

He

stressed further that "[w]e are the only service without a fully
Ultimately our isolated
independent defense organization.
to compel us to
or
Congress
position will prompt the judiciary,
73 At the end of the day, the proposal for an independent
change."
defense bar proved to be too radical for some within the legal
community and for commanders who feared losing the power over
the process.74 A new, revised order governing the conduct of judge
advocates ultimately was published in 1999 but without the
of the defense bar sought by
revisions pushing for independence
75
the SJA to the Commandant.
In 2002, the CDC pushed a proposal providing three courses
of action to realign or "reorganize the defense bar, requiring it to
provide defense services to the operating forces and Supporting
Establishment and eliminating the current requirement for Law
Centers and Legal Services Support Sections to do so." 76 These
courses of action ranged from minor, more cosmetic changes such
as separation of office spaces to the more radical change of
77
providing complete independence for the defense bar.
Predictably, none of these courses of action were selected or
implemented at that time.
Each successive CDC makes equally unsuccessful pushes to
gain independence of the Marine defense bar to match the
independence that our sister services have enjoyed for more than
thirty years. 78 Each effort to revise or reorganize the defense bar
meets with the same arguments against change. A review of the
e-mail traffic between senior SJAs who were asked to offer
suggestions for change prior to the 2010 submission reflect the
same recycled arguments against independence that were offered

72.
73.

Id.
Id. (emphasis in original).

See Baker, Information Paper 5800/CDC, supra note 47, at 8 (citing
74.
E-mail from Colonel Brian Palmer to CDC Baker (Dec. 20, 2010)),
75. Id. at 8 & n.19 (referencing MCO P5800.16A cancelling MCO
5800.11A on Aug. 31, 1999).
76. Chief Defense Counsel Position Paper "Defense Reorganization"
dated April 2, 2002, supra, note 55.
77. Id.
78. See Roake, supra note 46; Canham, supra note 35; Hess, supra note
39; Scovel, supra note 67; Baker, supra note 47.
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in the early 1980's. 79 One SJA's input offered blunt advice to the
CDC: "[flrom the lines of authority, to the devolution of command
authority, to the funding problems, to the legal issues regarding
termination, parity, and a host of other details, I see nothing but
' 80

trouble."

At the end of the most recent push for independence in 2010
and early in 2011, the CDC is left with a number of significant
revisions and modifications to the two manuals currently
governing the conduct of judge advocates in the fleet - the Marine
Legal Administration Manual and the Navy's Judge Advocate's
General Manual. 8 1 As significant as the revisions are, the call for
change and independence once again falls short of the mark and
the CDC is left with something less than the power and
independence necessary to provide free and unfettered defense
services in the Marine Corps without significant government or
command influence.
CAN WE DEFINE JUSTICE AFTER 9/11 AND CAN JUSTICE BE ACHIEVED?

One glaring absence from the brief history above is how, or
even if, the delivery of military defense services, particularly
within the Marine Corps, changed after 9/11. Perhaps the answer
is entirely obvious in light of this omission. The cases which
provide the facts for situations 3 and 4 above both occurred after
9/11 and a close look at the proceedings in each case show quite
clearly they are tried in much the same way as cases tried prior to
9/11. In fact, it is precisely because they are tried in the same
manner, using the same procedures set forth in Chapter 2 of the
LEGADMINMAN and paragraphs 0130 and 0131 of the
JAGMAN, that errors are cited by the courts and questions raised
about the fair and just provision of defense services in the Marine
Corps. 82 The SJA who denied the participation of a reserve judge
79. E-mails on file with the Chief Defense Counsel of the Marine Corps
at the Navy Annex in Washington, D.C.
80. E-mail from Col Louis Puleo to Chief Defense Counsel (Oct.14, 2010).
81. MCO 5800.16A [hereinafter LEGADMINMAN]; JAGINST 5800.7E
[hereinafter JAGMAN].

82. Wiechmann, 67 M.J. 456, 462 (2009). The court in Wiechmann made
the following finding, "[t]he convening authority erred by restricting the role
of Appellant's detailed defense counsel during the pretrial proceedings,
including the proceedings concerning the Article 32 investigation and pretrial
agreement negotiations. In so doing, the convening authority improperly
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advocate as a properly detailed counsel in the Wiechmann case
while relying on a restrictive reading of the LEGADMINMAN and
JAGMAN provisions cited above is the same senior SJA who
"see[s] nothing but trouble" when the issue of an independent
defense bar is raised. 3
When the events at Abu Ghraib unfolded in a very public way
in 2004,84 people inside and outside the military openly
questioned whether the soldiers accused of such actions could get
a fair trial in an Army court.8 5 The same questions are being
86
asked again in Private First Class Manning's case today.
However, an independent, robust defense bar makes it far easier
for the Army to answer the public outcry for justice in cases
87
arising from the battlefield that have international implications.
Likewise, any cases tried by the Air Force since 9/11 enjoy the
balance and at least appearance of conflict free defense services
provided by judge advocates serving in an independent and
separate defense command.8 8 While at least one recent article
questions the ability of the military in general to effectively try
cases in the field,8 9 there is no dispute that the Army and Air
Force are at least better equipped to provide conflict free defense

interfered with the attorney-client relationship established at the time of
LtCol Shelburne's initial detail as Appellant's defense counsel. These actions
violated Appellant's rights under Article 27, UCMJ." Id.
The Lee court made the following observations before remanding the
case: "[a]ppellant's declaration implicates three related questions. First,
when, and under what circumstances, did defense counsel serve as a trial
counsel, and did military counsel labor under a conflict of interest in
representing Appellant under such circumstances? ...Second, if defense
counsel had in fact begun duties as a prosecutor, was defense counsel subject
to the supervision of trial counsel in Appellant's case? ...
Third, whatever the
underlying facts, did Appellant make an informed decision to waive any
conflict of interest based on the actual facts at the time he consented to
further representation?" United States v. Lee, 66 M.J. 387, 389-90 (2008).
83. See Puleo E-mail, supranote 80.
84. See supra note 17.
85. MSNBC, msnbc.com, Abu Ghraib Soldier Loses His Bid to Dismiss
Trial, Dec. 6, 2004, http:iwww.msnbc.msn.com/id16658513/nstworld-newsmideast/n_africa.
86.

See Savage, supranote 9.

87. See Chapter 6, Army Regulation 27-10 dated 16 Nov. 2005.
88. See JAJD Operating Instruction 51-204 dated 15 April 2010.
89. Franklin D. Rosenblatt, Non-Deployable: The Court-MartialSystem
inCombat from 2001 to 2009, ARMY LAW., Sept. 2010 at 12.

628 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAWREVIEW [Vol. 16:608
90
counsel under the current regulations.
While many Marine officers are critical of leadership failures
that allow for Abu Ghraib type scandals or alleged leaks of
classified information on a scale such as the one being charged in
Private First Class Manning's case, the Marine Corps has not
escaped the cruel eye of the media in its own handling of cases
Names like Hamdinya, 9 ' Haditha92 or
arising since 9/11.
Fallujah 9 3 evoke reactions from every Marine officer. To the
extent that civilians have followed the trials or investigations
arising from incidents at each of these towns, similar questions
are asked about what type of justice can be obtained when a
convening authority must answer to the critics in the media or in
Congress. The Marine Corps's response is the same. The
expectation is that all Marine judge advocates will be general
practitioners rather than litigation specialists. 94 And yet, the
Marine Corps still argues that they try "three times more courtsmartial (both per judge advocate and per 1,000 service members)

90. See Army Regulations 27-10, supranotes 87; see also JAJD
Operating Instructions, supra note 88.
91. A squad of Marines and a Navy Corpsman were tried separately on
charges stemming from an abduction and killing of a local Iraqi male in 2005.
The trials took place in 2006-07 at Camp Pendleton, CA. The squad leader,
Sgt. Hutchins, was convicted of a number of violations under the UCMJ and
his punishment included confinement of fifteen years. See United States v.
Hutchins, 69 M.J. 282 (2011).
92. A squad of Marines patrolling Haditha in 2005 killed twenty-four
men and women after their convoy was attacked by an improvised explosive
device, or an IED. Several of the Marines in the squad and several officers in
the chain of command faced charges ranging from dereliction to murder for
the killings in the town. All were either acquitted, had charges dismissed, or
were allowed to retire with the exception of the squad leader, Sgt. Wuterich,
who is still pending court-martial at the time of this writing. See United
States v. Chessani, No. NMCCA 200800299, 2009 WL 690110 (N-M Ct. Crim.
App. Mar. 17, 2009).
93. Video cameras captured a Marine shooting a wounded Iraqi lying in
a mosque. See SKY NEWS, Fallujah:'US Marine Shot Dead Prisoner,' Nov. 16,
2004,
http://news.sky.com/skynews/Home/Fallujah-US-Marine-Shot-DeadPrisoner/Article/200411313249236?lpos=HomeArticleBody-CopyRegion.0
&lid=ARTICLE_13249236_Fallujah%3AUSMarineShotDeadPrisoner.
The Marine was never charged but the footage caused a media frenzy and led
to calls for the Marine's court-martial for an alleged law of armed conflict
violation. The command did a thorough investigation and exonerated the
Marine.
94. Marine Corps Legal Specialists - Strategic Action Plan2010-2015, at
15. See also STRATEGIC ACTION PLAN 2010-2015, supra note 30.
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than any other Service." 95 The argument follows that because so
many cases are tried under a system that has been in place for
more than twenty-five years, the need for change is negligible or
non-existent. 9 6 The perception from within is that the system is
fair and that justice is already being served so there is no need to
redefine the mission or seek greater justice particularly in a time
when resources are already being stretched by operational
concerns. 9 7 To the extent change is necessary, the vision for the
future calls for increased resources for the prosecutors through a
new program called the Trial Counsel Assistance Program
established in May, 2010.98 However, the defense bar has a "wellestablished SharePoint portal" and minor revisions to the existing
orders and regulations will answer any future needs. 99
This response does not go far enough to establish
independence and parity with the Marine prosecutors. Justice in
this higher tempo, more complex environment demands the
defense bar in the Marine Corps be removed from government
influence and funded separately so as to allow the flexibility
necessary to comply with the ethical standard of zealous, conflict
free representation.1 0 0 The Hutchins case arising out of the
incidents at Hamdniya was overturned because of counsel
issues, 10 1 the Chessani case was dismissed because of unlawful
command influence by senior lawyers involved in the case, 10 2 and
rights
the court in Wiechmann found error in the denial of counsel
03
1
decision.
court's
lower
the
reversing
of
short
but stopped

95. Id.
96. The SJA to CMC claims, "It has worked well for more than 25 years."
Id. at 16.
97. "Our focus on operational requirements has the potential to erode
critical judge advocate skills for some of our other core competencies." Id. at
19.
98. Id. at 23.
99. Id.
100. See generally Office of the Judge Advocate General, Dep't of the
Navy, Jag Instruction 5803.1C ( JAGINST 5803.1C) (largely following the
ABA Model Rules for legal ethics governing the ethical conduct of all Navy
and Marine judge advocates.)
101. See United States v. Hutchins, 69 M.J. 282, 293 (2011).
102. See United States v. Chessani, No. NMCCA 200800299, 2009 WL
690110, at *7 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. Mar. 17, 2009).
103. See United States v. Wiechmann, 67 M.J. 456, 462-64 (2009).
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WHAT IS THE REMEDY?

In his article to the Marine Corps Gazette more than twenty
years ago, Lieutenant Colonel Roake called for three substantive
changes to the Marine defense bar. 104 He prophetically noted that
if the Marine Corps is unwilling to create a completely
independent defense bar, the Corps should at a minimum increase
the rank of the senior counsel on the defense side of the equation,
mandate additional training for judge advocates assigned to
defense, and mandate specific lengths of time a counsel must be
assigned to the defense before a counsel could be reassigned
within the legal community. 10 5 Over the next twenty-five years,
counsel serving as senior defense or regional defense counsel are
required to have the rank of field grade officers and additional
training has been mandated, although the convening authority, an
arm of the government, is still the one who must agree to pay for
the training.
Colonel Scovel (and all of the other Chief Defense Counsel
who submitted proposals from 1998 to the present) offered three
courses of action in his Point Paper to the SJA to the
Commandant. 10 6 The biggest difference between Colonel Scovel's
proposed courses of action and the ones that came prior to 2002 is
that all of his proposed courses of action involved the creation of a
new and entirely separate defense command. 107 The degrees of
change were varied in terms of movement of counsel or
realignment of some physical facilities but no matter how minimal
or how robust the change, they all involved the prospect of
creating and funding a new command for the defense bar. 0 8 His
proposals, like those of his predecessors and successors in the
Chief Defense Counsel's office, failed to gain support from those
who had the power to make a change.
The most recent call for change appears to be headed down a
similar path. Agreements are already being put in place that
allow for measured changes to Chapter 2 of the LEGADMINMVAN
and paragraphs 0130 and 0131 of JAGMAN' 0 9 as opposed to the
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

Roake, supra note 46, at 28.
Id. at 28-29.
See Defense Reorganization, supra note 55.
Id.
Id.
See generally Baker, Information Paper, supra note 47 (supporting
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move to establish a completely independent defense bar. One
concern being voiced as the primary reason for maintaining the
status quo rather than making a bolder and more creative solution
is that the mandated 506 Review 1 0 may simply be a precursor to
combining all of the judge advocates from all the services into one
large service. If the defense bar is to be completely different in the
Marine Corps, then what makes these judge advocates any
different than an Army judge advocate or an Air Force judge
advocate? The answer to this question is perhaps oversimplified
and a return to the remedy proposed by Lieutenant Colonel Roake
in 1988. Creation of an entirely separate defense command and
specific identifiable terms for the length of duty a judge advocate
is assigned to the defense command solves the vast majority of the
criticism from the old guard. Limited terms of duty - perhaps
eighteen months to two years in duration - ensure the officer does
not forget she is an officer of the Marines first but gives her the
autonomy to act with the necessary zeal and intensity required to
serve her client's best interest without fear of reprisal by the
While
commanding officer or senior staff judge advocates.
recommended tours of duty are contemplated in the new drafts of1
the orders being reviewed at the time of this writing,II
recommended tour lengths as opposed to mandated tour lengths
leaves too much subjectivity in the process. Even more so,
recommended tour lengths in the absence of a separate command
structure make any such change meaningless and will not change
the way justice is pursued in the current courts-martial system.
CONCLUSION

In Mr. Deale's letter to the NY Times, he eloquently points
out that what happens in our military courts or tribunals is
simply a "continuation of the war." 112 What measure of justice is
afforded the accused in our courts-martial is defined by those
sitting on the sidelines in the comfortable settings of our offices
and headquarters, and yet the application of that measured

draft changes to MCO P5800.16A and JAGINST 5800.7E).
110. See National Defense Authorization Acts for Fiscal Year 2010, Pub.
L. No. 111-84, 123 Stat. 2190 (2009).
111. See Baker, supra, note 47, at 1 & n. 1, 9.
112. Deale, supra, note 1.
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justice reaches across borders, across services and has direct and

palpable impact on service members accused of violating the
UCMJ while serving on the front lines as much as those who
stand accused in garrison. While we have engaged in the "Long
War," the way we fight has changed significantly, and the way we
engage the enemy has developed over time.
Unfortunately for Marines who face the prospect of a courtmartial, the process for them is still very much the same as if they
were charged during the Cold War of the 1980's. The origin of the
phrase "justice delayed is justice denied" is in dispute; yet, with
regard to the issue of the establishment of the Marine defense bar,
no other phrase is more appropriate. As we stand on the verge of
an opportunity to make a long overdue change to the orders and
regulations that would operate to establish a new, independent
and robust Marine defense bar, justice delayed truly is justice
denied and the definition of justice remains the same. 113After all,
"[i]t has worked well for more than [twenty-five] years."

113.

MARINE CORPS LEGAL SERVICES, STRATEGIC ACTION PLAN 2010-2015,

supra note 30, at 16.

